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ResumenLa Unión Europea se encuentra en crisis durante los últimos 7 años. Primero fue la Euro-Crisis de 2010; luego vino la crisis de refugiados con cerca de un 
millon de ellos solamente en Alemania en el 2015; luego los ingleses votaron para dejar 
la Unión Europea en 2016 (el llamado Brexit). En todos estos momentos se estimuló a la 
derecho cuando los partidos de tendencia anti-inmigrante crecieron en fuerza en cada 
uno de los países europeos. Otra situación brotó cuando la Unión Europea y sus esta-
dos miembros tuvieron que contender con la anexión de Crimea por Rusia junto con la 
agresión a la Ucrania del Este, porque Putin lanzó diversas amenazas contra Europa del 
Este, incluyendo a Estados miembros de Europa. Este escrito examina cada una de estas 
crisis y discute sus implicaciones para la estabilidad de la Unión Europea y su misma 
existencia actual en la situación presente y su proyección hacia el futuro.
Palabras clave: Crisis, Unión Europea, Inestabilidad.
Abstract
The European Union (EU) is in crisis during the last seven years. One of them was the 
Euro-Crisis in 2010; then came the refugee crisis with nearly one million refugees to 
Germany alone since 2015; then the British voted to leave the EU in 2016 (the Brexit). 
In all these moments it came a fillip to right wing when the anti-immigrant parties in-
creased their strenght in nearly every country of the EU.  Another situation came when 
the EU and its member states have had to contend with Russian annexation of Crimea 
and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, as well as Putin’s threats against Eastern Europe, 
including member states of the EU.  This paper examines each of these crises and dis-
cusses their implications for European Union stability and its very existence now in the 
present situation and the prospects for the European project in the future.
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Introduction
The European Union, EU, has been rocked to its founda-
tions by a cascade of crises in the last seven years.  First 
the Euro-Crisis beginning in 2010; then the refugee crisis 
that brought over nearly one million refugees to Germany 
alone since 2015; the British voted last year to leave the EU, 
Brexit; all these gave a fillip to right wing, anti-immigrant 
parties in nearly every country of the EU.  Lastly, the EU 
and its member states have had to contend with Russian 
annexation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine, 
as well as Putin’s threats against Eastern Europe, inclu-
ding member states of the EU.  This paper examines each 
of these crises in turn and discusses their implications for 
European Union stability and its very existence in its pre-
sent form and the prospects for the European project.
Euro-Crisis
The Euro-Crisis began in April, 2009 when the EU or-
dered France, Spain, Ireland and Greece to reduce their 
budget deficits as in November concerns about some 
members’ debts started to grow following the Dubai so-
vereign debt crisis (BBC, June 13, 2012).  In the following 
month Greece admitted it debts had reached the highest 
ever, though the Prime Minister insisted Greece would 
not default on its debts (Ibid).  Nevertheless by May 2010 
the Eurozone members and the IMF agreed to a bailout 
package to Ireland (Ibid).  After denying Portugal would 
be next, in May 2011 a bailout was approved for Portu-
gal and a second bailout of Greece was agreed (Ibid).  By 
August the European Central Bank, ECB announced it 
would buy Italian and Spanish bonds to bring down their 
borrowing costs (Ibid).  Both countries adopted austerity 
budgets while Greece was pressured to do the same.  In 
September EU head Jose Manuel Barroso warned the EU 
was facing it greatest challenge (Ibid).  The next month 
the ECB announced emergency loans to help banks whi-
le G20 finance ministers met to continue efforts to find 
a solution to the debt crisis in the Eurozone (Ibid).  The 
latter included a proposal to establish an inter-govern-
mental treaty containing new budgetary rules to take 
on the crisis Ibid).  At this point one can note the re-
sort to intergovernmental measures, a point developed 
later.  Throughout 2012 talks continued, culminating in 
new rules making it harder to break budget deficit limits 
(Ibid).  The rest of the year saw Spain and Italy see their 
borrowing costs increase while concerns grew that Fran-
ce as well as Italy may need a bailout (Ibid).
One view is that the huge increases in debt from 2007 to 
2010, coinciding with the great recession, was brought on 
by a fall in housing prices leading to large losses by the 
banks (Economics Help, July 10, 2014; Alphaville, Fe-
bruary 6, 2015).  The problem was exacerbated by the lack 
of a strategy on the part of the EU and the absence of a 
lender of last resort (Economics Help, Ibid).  The ECB 
initially said it wouldn’t serve in this capacity (Ibid).  The 
recession and credit crunch caused a rapid rise in gover-
nment debt, particularly severely in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal (Ibid).  Consequently there was tremendous 
pressure on the Euro, but no easy way to leave the com-
mon currency (Ibid).  The ECB held a great amount of 
sovereign debt and default would have put at risk its very 
existence (the balance, August 19, 2016).  The political fa-
llout in domestic politics is addressed in the rise of anti-
austerity and anti-EU parties in a later section.
Refugee Crisis
More than a million migrants crossed into Europe in 2015 
producing crisis for individual countries and division 
within the EU over how to deal with this mass influx (BBC, 
May 4, 2016).  The vast majority of refugees are from Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, as thousands flee the violence in 
those countries (Ibid).  Germany has received the most, 
more than a million, with nearly a half million applying 
for asylum (Ibid).  Hungary is second (Hungary’s reaction 
to this movement of people into and through the country 
is addressed later).  The EU average numbers of refugees 
per 100,000 of own population is nearly 1,800 in Hungary 
with Sweden closely second with nearly 1,700 (Ibid).  For 
Germany the figure is nearly 600 and for the UK 60 (Ibid). 
The EU average in 2016 was 260 (Ibid).  As a consequence 
of the disproportionate burden faced by some countries 
tensions have risen in the EU and particularly in those 
countries receiving the majority of migrants, Greece, Italy, 
and Hungary (Ibid).  EU ministers approved in Septerm-
ber, 2016 a plan to relocate 160,000 refugees EU-wide but 
the plan for now will only apply to those who are in Italy 
and Greece (Ibid; European Commission, 2016).  Another 
54,000 were to be moved from Hungary but the govern-
ment rejected the plan (BBC, Ibid).  
In the Schengen area, where people may move freely 
without border controls, some member states have reins-
tated checks at their borders with other EU countries (Eu-
ropean Commission, Ibid).  The EU has recently reached 
an agreement with Turkey, involving swaps of refugees, 
expected to stop the uncontrolled flow of migrants from 
Turkey to Greece (Ibid).  This agreement calls for “irregu-
lar” migrants arriving in Greece to be returned to Turkey, 
while the EU will take in Syrians for Turkey who sought to 
make the journey in a “regular” way (Ibid).  Nevertheless 
the basic principle remains the same:  people should apply 
for asylum in the first country they arrive, unless they have 
family elsewhere, but if a member state is overwhelmed 
there should be “solidarity and a fair sharing of responsi-
bility” within the EU (Ibid).  So far this has been difficult 
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by Germany and France to establish political considera-
tions as their priority over economic considerations (Ibid). 
Thus one consequence of Brexit may be for the other EU 
member states to respond to the crisis by pursuing further 
integration (Olivier, n.d.).  One scenario sees the emergen-
ce of a core Eurozone union as one in overlapping organi-
zations managing European relations (Ibid).  In any case 
within the EU Germany’s position is strengthened without 
Britain as a balancing force (Ibid).  Nevertheless without 
Britain the EU’s “soft power” is diminished, damaging 
further the EU’s regional and geo-political “punch” (Bui-
ter, Rahbari, Schulz, VOX, March 2, 2016).
Rise of Anti-EU Parties
Even before Brexit and the Eurocrisis, or the refugee crisis, 
far right anti-EU parties have been challenging the mains-
team parties on the issues of immigration and members-
hip in the EU (Carroll, June, 2014).  Still all three, Brexit, 
Eurocrisis, and refugee crisis and immigration have invi-
gorated these parties and created a more attentive public. 
These parties are rising across Europe (Express, n.d.; BBC, 
May 23, 2016).  A description of each by country provides 
a broad look at the phenomenon.
The largest is the Freedom Party in Austria (35.1% in the 
last election, where leader Norbert Hofer was set to possi-
bly win October’s presidential election, followed by Ma-
rine Le Pen’s National Front in France (14%) and Geert 
Wilder’s Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (10%); and 
Slovakia’s Our Slovakia (8%)  (BBC, Ibid).  Far right natio-
nalist parties have also been surging in Denmark, Danish 
Peoples Party (21%); Sweden, Sweden Democrats (13%); 
and Finland, the Finns (18%). (Ibid).  Hungary’s Jobbik 
(21%) and Switzerlands’s Swiss Peeoples Party (29%) are 
either now in government, Switzerland, or provides es-
sential support to a conservative government, Hungary 
(Ibid).  In fact the Jobbik party is now the third largest 
party in Hungary (Ibid).   In Italy the anti-EU party is the 
Five Star Movement (Express, n.d.).  Smaller but growing 
parties are also to be found in Greece, Golden Dawn (7%); 
Cyprus, ELAM (3.7%); and even Germany, Alternative for 
Germany (4.7%).  The latter has done worryingly well in 
recent state elections (BBC, op cit) and could affect the 
outcome of this year’s general election.
Marine Le Pen is expected to come in first in the first round 
of the upcoming Presidential election, but not the runoff. 
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) was actually founded 
by economists opposed to the Euro but has drawn more 
support from its strident opposition to immigration and to 
its leader Franke Petry (BBC, Ibid).  Growing dissatisfac-
tion with Angela Merkl’s open door policy for the Syrian 
and other refugees has propelled the AfD to winning seats 
to implement.  One problem is that many Europeans fear 
the influx of refugees will increase the risk of terrorism 
while posing an economic burden on their countries (Pew 
Research Center, September 16, 2016).  These findings are 
widespread but particularly strong in Hungary, Germany, 
Netherlands, and Italy (Ibid).  These views are especially 
strong among those with negative views of Muslims (Ibid). 
The related rise of anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties is 
elaborated on later.  A great many Greeks, Italians, and 
Hungarians, Poles, and Dutch say diversity makes their 
country a worse place to live, though there are slightly 
more positive views in Sweden and in Spain (Ibid).  But in 
every country a vast majority are unhappy with the EU’s 
handling of the refugee crisis (Ibid).  
Brexit
The driving issue behind the British voters opting to leave 
the EU was immigration, half of whom come from other 
EU countries (BBC, March 1, 2017).  Poles constitute the 
largest number by far, over 800,000 by December, 2014, 
followed distantly behind by Ireland, then roughly equal 
numbers of Romanians, Italians, and French (Ibid).  To 
note, hundreds of thousands of UK migrants live in 
other EU nations, particularly Spain, Ireland, and Fran-
ce (Ibid).  Britain leaving the EU raises serious questions 
about the fate of those Britons living in other EU coun-
tries and of EU nationals living in the UK (Ibid).  Pro-
Brexit advocates insisted that it was necessary to protect, 
or restore, the country’s identity, usually expressed by 
opposition to immigration (Traub, New York Times, 
June, 20, 2016).  The debate also cut along class lines, 
with support for leaving especially strong among those 
with less education and lower incomes (Ibid).  In other 
words Brexit is a “vessel for anti-establishment and anti-
elite feelings” aimed at the mainstream parties as much 
as at the EU (Ibid).  The victory for Brexit has numerous 
significant ramifications for the UK and the EU, which is 
discussed below.  It can be noted here however that Brexit 
can and has spurred the Scottish Parliament to vote for 
a referendum on a “Scexit,” where Scotland would leave 
the UK and join the EU as an independent member state 
(Ibid; CNN, March 29, 2017).  Also discussed at length 
below, Brexit has given momentum to anti-immigrant 
parties across Europe (Telegraph, June 24, 2016).  
Apart from the effect of Britain’s withdrawal on the EU’s 
economic interests (16% of EU goods are exports to the 
UK), the EU’s political interests are also at risk (Patel and 
Reh, n.d.).  In particular is the risk of “contagion,” where, 
in a worst case scenario Eurosceptic forces in such cou-
ntries as Denmark, Austria, and Sweden follow the UK 
and pressure their governments to hold referenda on con-
tinued EU membership (Ibid).  This could lead the EU, led 
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in half of the German Lander parliaments (Ibid).  The 
governing coalition in Denmark depends on the Danish 
Peoples Party’s support (Ibid).  In Finland the Finn’s lea-
der is Foreign Minister in a coalition government, while in 
Sweden the Sweden Democrats, the third largest party, is 
shunned by other parties in the Riksdag (Ibid).  Recall that 
Sweden has taken in the second largest number of refugees 
after Germany.  Italy’s Five Star Movement has called for a 
referendum on the single currency (Express, op cit).  Geert 
Wilder’s Party for Freedom’s strength in the March Dutch 
elections would be seen as a “bellweather” for how well 
anti-EU far right parties will do in France, Germany, and 
possibly Italy later the year (Rubin, New York Times, Fe-
bruary 27, 2017).  Whether he wins or comes in second he 
has already pushed Dutch politics to the right and made 
possible a discussion about “shutting down immigration 
and dismantling the EU,” a conversation that would have 
been unimaginable not all that long ago (Ibid).
“Rocking the EU”
Each of these crises would by itself have had major reper-
cussions on the EU; simultaneously they have rocked the 
EU to its foundations.  Beginning with the Eurocrisis, res-
ponding to this crisis has resulted in a shift in decision ma-
king, setting and monitoring compliance with budgetary 
demands, to the executive European Council and reducing 
the European Parliament, EP, and national parliaments to 
mere observers (Dawson and de Witte, 2013).  New entities 
were created, the temporary European Financial Stability 
Facility, EFSF, and the permanent European Stability Me-
chanism, ESM (Ibid).  In the view of two observers, these 
developments have upset the Constitutional balance in the 
EU (Ibid).  The substantive balance has been destabilized by 
circumventing the EU’s limited authority in affecting redis-
tributive policies (Ibid).  Decreasing the “voice” of weaker 
interests and representative institutions has altered the ins-
titutional balance (Ibid).  A loss in protection of smaller and 
poorer member states (Greece, Portugal) and their citizens 
from majoritarian tendencies has threatened the spatial 
balance of the EU (Ibid).  Two other authors have descri-
bed the “path dependent” development of the crisis, where 
institutional creation at the outset determined the options 
at subsequent steps (Gocaj and Meunier, 2013).  Specifically 
the creation of the ESFS and ESM established intergover-
nmentalism  as the mode of decision making (Ibid).  All 
this impacts the democratic bona fides of the EU response 
and exposed the “fault lines” within, specifically the Nor-
th/South split and separation between countries inside and 
outside (UK, inter alia) the Eurozone (Glencross, 2013).
While EU officials and diplomats have averred that the re-
fugee crisis is now effectively managed (Traub, October 18, 
2016), there are serious questions whether the deal reached 
with Turkey, to detain and swap refugees in return for bi-
llions of Euros and increased access to the EU will work. 
Recent anti-democratic actions by the Turkish President 
lead to EU criticism, while Erdogan threatens to abrogate 
the agreement.  So far in any case few refugees have been 
returned, leaving thousands stranded in Greece, adding 
to that country’s already dire financial straits (Ibid).  In 
September of 2015 the Council agreed to a quota system 
for accepting refugees, but four Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, including Hungary, opposed the policy 
and it was largely ignored (Ibid).  As with the Eurozone 
crisis, the refugee crisis illustrated that where national in-
terests and national sovereignty are implicated “there is no 
such thing as ‘Europe,’” only individual states (Ibid).  The 
refugee crisis moved from humanitarian crisis to political 
crisis (Ibid).  Thus the refugee crisis and broader resen-
tment of immigrants fed directly into the cause of Brexit 
and the rise of anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties.
The impacts of Brexit were discussed earlier, but again 
can be noted it will affect the EU’s institutions and deci-
sion making procedures, for example Qualified Majority 
Voting on the Council, representation and party balance 
in the EP, and the balance of power within the EU (Patel 
and Reh, op cit).  A collapse of the EU itself is a worst case 
scenario (presented by a Brexit contagion and rush for the 
doors (Ibid).  Alternative scenarios include a weakened 
EU with the potential for unravelling or less drastic a core 
Eurozone union as one of a series of overlapping organi-
zations in Europe (Olivier, op cit).  Alternatively the EU 
could muddle through, where the EU is still Europe’s pre-
dominant political organization but struggles over inter-
governmental and supranational responsibilities remain 
(Ibid).  Finally the EU could end up more united without 
a recalcitrant Britain, with a clearer leadership, though its 
military potential is more limited without the UK (Ibid).
Finally, putting strain on the EU, both internally and for 
joint action with the US is Russia.  The sanctions regime, 
in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggres-
sion in Ukraine, could weaken or fall apart, not least de-
pending on the approach taken to Putin’s threats by the 
new Trump Administration.  This challenge too puts pres-
sure on the internal unity of the EU and its ability to speak 
and act with a single voice.
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